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Freezing Out Noncompliant 
Ships: Why the Arctic Council 
Must Enforce the Polar Code 
Richard O.G. Wanerman1 
The International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code is 
intended to regulate the nature of commercial shipping in the 
Arctic and Antarctic by setting minimum standards for ships 
transiting though Polar waters. This region of the world is 
unique, and has certain characteristics that make it both 
attractive and dangerous. However, the Polar Code, which is 
still in draft form, does not currently have an enforcement 
mechanism apart from traditional state party monitoring, which 
may result in oversights that lead to catastrophic accidents in 
remote parts of the Arctic. This Note analyzes how the absence 
of a clear enforcement mechanism and uncertainty regarding 
the draft Code could result in the failure of the Code to protect 
the Arctic while still permitting shipping through it. This Note 
further analyzes how the Arctic Council, an institutional 
assembly of states with an Arctic territorial presence, could 
assume a monitoring and enforcement role within the Polar 
Code, due to its existing experience with the Arctic and with its 
recent expansion of responsibilities. This Note concludes that 
the International Maritime Organization needs an active 
enforcement mechanism for the Polar Code to avoid 
noncompliance through negligence and the risk of catastrophic 
accidents, as well as to encourage industry compliance with the 
Code. This Note recommends that the International Maritime 
Organization make the Arctic Council and its member states the 
enforcement mechanism for the Polar Code, based on the 
Council’s prior success with a Search and Rescue Agreement.  
These states have the capacity and interest in enforcement, and 
can help bring about rapid international acceptance of the Polar 
Code as the Arctic Ocean becomes a viable sea route. 
 
1. Editor-in-Chief, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law; 
B.A., Lawrence University (Jun. 2011); J.D., Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law (expected May 2015). Thanks to Faculty 
Advisor Prof. David Kocan and the staff of the Journal, especially 
Jeremy Saks and Garret Bowman, for their advice and assistance on this 
Note. 
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I. Introduction 
The Arctic Ocean is changing faster than the international 
community can currently respond. The sea ice is retreating at an 
uncomfortably rapid rate,2 making the Arctic Ocean increasingly 
accessible for commercial uses. The Arctic states, with high volumes 
of natural commodities found within the Arctic Circle, want to 
transport these commodities to market by ship, which remains the 
most cost-effective means of cargo and freight transportation.3 Yet, no 
comprehensive, Arctic-centric legal regime currently exists for 
shipping regulation.4 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
released an official draft of the intended Polar Code for such shipping 
in late January, 2014, after many years of work; its projected date of 
earliest implementation in 2016.5 The lack of rapidity regarding such 
an agreement is troubling, given the rate of expansion of open water 
 
2. See, e.g., Rani Gran & Maria-José Viñas, NASA Finds Thickest Parts 
of Arctic Ice Cap Melting Faster, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. 
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/thick-
melt.html (detailing the results of satellite analysis regarding the retreat 
of sea ice and the ice cap, which results in expanded open water in the 
Arctic Ocean).   
3. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 
76–77 (2009), available at http://www.arctic.gov/ publications/ 
AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf [hereinafter ARCTIC MARINE 
SHIPPING ASSESSMENT].  
4. ØYSTEIN JENSEN, THE IMO GUIDELINES FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN ARCTIC 
ICE-COVERED WATERS: FROM VOLUNTARY TO MANDATORY TOOL FOR 
NAVIGATION SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION? 5–7 (2007), 
available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R0207.pdf. 
5. See Shipping in Polar Waters: Development of an International Code of 
Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, INT’L MAR. ORG. (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.imo.org/ MediaCentre/ HotTopics/ 
polar/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter Shipping in Polar Waters].   
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in the Arctic,6 and is a policy area into which the Arctic Council must 
play a more important role. 
An Arctic shipping agreement has been a priority issue for the 
Arctic Council since the ministerial meeting in 2000.7 The IMO, which 
had an interim set of guidelines for Polar operations,8 is now working 
on integrating the draft Polar Code into the existing IMO guidelines 
for safety and pollution to make it a mandatory instrument.9 
However, neither the existing guidelines nor the final Polar Code will 
have active enforcement powers; as a result, “actual application is 
evident only through state practice and the extent to which 
international shipping complies.”10 This legal void will pose a serious 
problem for the future integrity of the Arctic, and is one that the 
Arctic Council should fill. It has already demonstrated its ability to 
work together on issues of mutual safety and welfare in the enactment 
of a search and rescue agreement (SAR Agreement), 11 and can build 
on the principles of that agreement in creating an enforcement regime 
for the Polar Code in the Arctic that is amenable to the IMO. Such 
role within the pending Polar Code establishes the Council’s position 
as a unified body for the region while also establishing a clearly 
enforceable legal system for maritime standards in the Arctic by the 
states whose shores border it and whose people mostly utilize its 
waters.12   
The Arctic Council must have an enforcement role in the Polar 
Code for the Code to be effective in the Arctic. Part II will briefly 
examine the special nature of the Arctic region, and why close 
cooperation between the Arctic Council states is vital to the 
successful management of this region. Part III will discuss the nature 
of the Polar Code, why it needs an active enforcement mechanism, 
and how the recent history of the Arctic Council demonstrates its 
viability as the best entity to enforce the Polar Code. Part IV will 
 
6. See, e.g., Gran & Viñas, supra note 1.   
7. ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE BARROW DECLARATION: THE SECOND 
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, ¶ 11 (2000), available at 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/ 
category/5-declarations [hereinafter Barrow Declaration]. 
8. See generally INT’L MAR. ORG., GUIDELINES FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN 
POLAR WATERS (2010), available at http://www.imo.org/ Publications/ 
Documents/ Attachments/ Pages%20from%20E190E.pdf [hereinafter 
Polar Code].  
9. See Shipping in Polar Waters, supra note 4. 
10. See JENSEN, supra note 3, at v. 
11. See Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement 
with Other Arctic Nations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163285.htm 
12. See ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 77. 
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then lay out the appearance of the proposed enforcement regime. Part 
V will conclude with a look at the future of binding Arctic Council 
agreements and cooperation with the IMO on matters of Arctic Ocean 
affairs. 
II. The Special Nature of the Arctic 
The Arctic is a global region with unique characteristics. Of the 
Arctic’s approximately thirty million square kilometers,13 fourteen 
million are water.14 Ice covers the majority of this water for most of 
the year.15 Unlike any other ocean in the world, landmasses almost 
entirely surround the Arctic Ocean, with only a few notable points of 
clear transit to either the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans. In essence, it is 
a semi-enclosed sea.16 Four million people live within this thirty 
million square kilometer region, a mix of indigenous peoples and 
settlers from southern locations. The majority of these people rely on 
the Arctic Ocean in some capacity for their existence in the far 
north.17 This permanent population also lives in an environmentally 
extreme, yet also very sensitive, region of the world. The Arctic region 
is defined by its extremes and its cold. The Arctic Circle, the 
commonly accepted delimitation of the Arctic region, is defined as the 
southernmost boundary of 24-hour sunlight at the Summer Solstice, 
as well as the northernmost boundary of 24-hour darkness at the 
Winter Solstice.18 That darkness aids in the constant cooling of the 
seawater into nearly impenetrable ice,19 which has been an assumed 
factor in Arctic navigation for centuries.20    
13. JENSEN, supra note 3, at 1. 
14. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 16. 
15. JENSEN, supra note 3, at 1. 
16. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 18 (2009). 
Although a number of rocky archipelagos lie at the outer edges of the 
accepted boundary of the Arctic Ocean, through which one could 
theoretically travel to leave Arctic waters, the two main points of entry 
and exit from the Arctic Ocean are: the Fram Strait between Greenland 
and Svalbard, which connects to the Atlantic Ocean; and the Bering 
Strait, between Alaska and eastern Russia, which connects to the Pacific 
Ocean. Map of the Arctic Ocean, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2013), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/map-of-the-
arctic-ocean/. However, unlike the Mediterranean Sea, a classic example 
of a closed sea, the exchange of water into and out of the Arctic Ocean 
is much greater, thus not making it a true closed sea. ARCTIC MARINE 
SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 16. 
17. JENSEN, supra note 3, at 1.   
18. See ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 19. 
19. See id. at 20. 
20. See id. at 25. 
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This old way of thinking about Arctic navigation is rapidly 
evolving due to the effects of climate change. Satellite scans of the 
Arctic over the past thirty years demonstrate a rapid loss of sea ice 
during the summer months, and predictive models do not show any 
replacement of the lost ice.21 By 2050, the Arctic Council believes that 
the Arctic Ocean will have a completely ice-free summer, permitting 
full circumnavigation of the Arctic Ocean by cargo ships.22 While this 
is a crisis from an environmental standpoint, it is a strategic gauge 
from a shipping standpoint. More ship traffic could enter the Arctic, 
and with the effects of the increased traffic in an environmentally 
weakened region yet unknown, the international legal regimes have 
yet to adequately address the potential impact of such activity.23   
Even with the presence of permanent sea ice closer to the North 
Pole and Northern Pole of Inaccessibility,24 the Arctic environment 
and human knowledge of the Arctic presents certain distinct 
challenges for shipping, which forms part of the basis for the creation 
of the Polar Code. Only two main sea routes exist within the 
boundary of the Arctic Ocean, the Northern Sea Route and the 
Northwest Passage.25 Although mariners have now used both these 
routes for some years, their conditions are still not fully known, as the 
Arctic Ocean is the least studied of the world’s oceans, and thus most 
hazardous for mariners.26 The constant presence of ice (for now) 
requires both certain kinds of ships and a certain level of competency 
with Arctic waters, which functionally limits many Arctic maritime 
operations to Arctic states.27 Further, even if Arctic sea ice becomes 
permanently smaller and weaker than it is today, such ice will still 
require monitoring by authorities and care by mariners to avoid any 
catastrophic disasters in a part of the world from that it is very 
difficult to be rescued.28   
 
21. See id. at 26–27. 
22. Id. at 27. 
23. See JENSEN, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
24. The Pole of Inaccessibility is the point in the Arctic Ocean furthest from 
any coastline, and thus the most difficult to reach in an emergency. It is 
located at 84° 3’ N, 174° 51’ W. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 2, at 27. 
25. These routes will be described infra, Part IV. 
26. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 16. 
27. See JENSEN, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
28. See ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 25 
(emphasizing that, even with climate change that severely reduces the 
extent of permanent polar ice, “there will always be Arctic sea ice cover 
to contend with”); see JENSEN, supra note 3, at 3–4 (recounting the 
near-sinking incident of the T/S Maxim Gorky in 1989 and the extreme 
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III.  The Need for an Enforceable Polar Code 
The predicted rise in maritime activity in the Arctic and the very 
delicate nature of the Arctic environment require a substantial 
response on the part of the Arctic Council states soon if they wish to 
achieve an effective solution to a growing problem. The coordinate 
factors of climate change and resource extraction are pushing 
maritime activity northward,29 into a part of the world that is rather 
small and ecologically sensitive, yet does not currently have an 
effective means of policing who goes into the Arctic and how they 
operate in the region. Although a combination of international legal 
standards theoretically governs regional maritime activity, none is yet 
comprehensive and region-specific.30 The Polar Code will provide the 
regulatory framework necessary to ensure the integrity of future 
Arctic shipping, but will leave no functional enforcement mechanism. 
This leaves the Arctic Council as the international body best suited to 
enforce the Polar Code and to establish the way forward in Arctic 
maritime affairs. Part A will discuss how the Arctic will become a 
more viable way of shipping goods around the world. Part B will 
discuss how the existing legal framework governing any Arctic 
shipping is inadequate to the pressing needs of the Arctic region. Part 
C will discuss how the Polar Code will make Arctic shipping a more 
viable and safe option for international trade, but also point out its 
flaws. Part D will use the Arctic Council’s SAR Agreement as a point 
of legal precedent for how the Arctic Council can act as an 
enforcement arm of the Polar Code. 
A. The Northward Push of Shipping 
The Arctic Ocean is the last frontier in commercial shipping, 
capturing the imagination of merchant traders and explorers for 
centuries. It is also increasingly becoming a realistic means of 
transporting goods and commodities around the world, saving time 
and fuel for large container ships moving between Northern 
Hemisphere ports.31 Without a comprehensive regulatory system for 
deciding which ships may operate in the Arctic, the international 
 
conditions encountered by the ship, crew, and passengers “despite the 
prompt Norwegian reaction”). 
29. See JENSEN, supra note 3, at 3.   
30. See RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153, CHANGES IN 
THE ARCTIC: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 20 (2013). 
31. See Heike Deggim, Int’l Mar. Org., Mar. Tech. Section, Progress 
Toward the Development of an International Polar Code, presented at 
the Annual General Meeting of the Royal Institute of Naval Architects 
(Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.imo.org/ MediaCentre/ 
HotTopics/polar/Documents/polar%20RINA%2004-13.pdf. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Freezing Out Noncompliant Ships 
435 
community and the Arctic region will have a difficult task of ensuring 
the reliability of all the ships that want to use the Arctic sea routes. 
Shipping in the Arctic primarily occurs on two major routes: the 
Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. The Northern Sea 
Route is almost entirely within Russian territorial waters, and runs 
along Russia’s northern shore. Under Russian law, its route is set 
from the Kara Gate to the Bering Strait, and runs 2,551 nautical 
miles; from the Bering Strait to Murmansk, Russia’s largest port at 
the western end of the Northern Sea Route, it is 3,074 nautical miles. 
32 For a hypothetical transit from the port of Rotterdam to the port 
of Yokohama, the current route through the Suez Canal, Gulf of 
Aden, and Straits of Malacca is up to 4,500 nautical miles longer than 
using the Northern Sea Route. Thus, opening up this route to 
commercial shipping would save on the cost and duration of 
intercontinental shipments.33 The Northern Sea Route, however, 
remains little used outside of local Russian traffic.34 Although four 
ships fully transited the route in 2010, which increased to 46 by the 
2012 shipping season, it remains relatively untested for regular use.35 
Further, the Northern Sea Route poses significant navigational 
challenges for the untrained mariner. Almost the entire length of the 
Northern Sea Route has depths of fewer than 100 meters, and in 
certain key areas can be as shallow as 10 meters, necessarily 
restricting the dimensions of the ships permitted to transit it.36 
Although Russian authorities do monitor ships currently using the 
Northern Sea Route, the impact on ships that do not ordinarily 
transit the Northern Sea Route is unknown. 
The Northwest Passage, the Western Hemisphere’s counterpart to 
the Northern Sea Route, is the more heavily explored, if less direct, 
Arctic shipping route. Indeed, the Arctic Council identifies five routes 
through which ships may use the Northwest Passage, though not all 
 
32. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 23. The Kara 
Gate is the water passage between the island of Novaya Zemlya and the 
Russian mainland. See id. 
33. Deggim, supra note 30. 
34. O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 17. The Northern Sea Route has also 
suffered from a lack of global exposure. Although officially opened to 
commercial traffic by the Soviet Union in 1931, the route remained 
exclusively under Soviet control for the next sixty years, until the Soviet 
authorities finally opened the route to international traffic in 1991. Id. 
35. Scott Borgerson, The Coming Arctic Boom, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.-Aug. 
2013, at 76, 82. 
36. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 23. At its 
eastern entry point, north of the Bering Strait, the Northern Sea 
Route’s depth is only 10 meters, forcing Russian maritime authorities to 
restrict access to ships with a draft of no greater than 6.7 meters. Id. 
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five routes are considered suitable for shipping.37 Generally, it is 
roughly 2,400 kilometers in length, from Baffin Island to Alaska, 
running along the northern Canadian shore and through the many 
archipelagos of the Canadian Arctic.38 In a hypothetical routing from 
the port of Rotterdam to the port of San Francisco, the Northwest 
Passage route would be at least 3,900 nautical miles shorter than the 
current route through the Panama Canal.39 Although once believed to 
be the fastest route between Europe and Asia, the reality of the 
Northwest Passage is a more complex balancing of ease of navigation 
and absence of ice. The southern routes of the Northwest Passage 
have less ice year-round, but also pose threats to navigation, both 
from the narrowness of the channels and the water depth. The 
northern routes are deeper, but have more year-round sea ice, and 
thus are less consistently reliable.40   
These two routes combine to serve an expanding economic zone 
that makes the Arctic more of a destination and origin region at the 
moment than a transiting region. Almost all the cargo ships in the 
region arrive to deliver supplies to Arctic communities and to natural 
resource extraction facilities, and leave with natural resource 
commodities. Resource extraction is becoming a key element of future 
Arctic development, with Russia becoming very active in drilling, and 
making no indications that it will reduce its extraction in the near 
future.41 The United States has also had long-term interests in natural 
resource extraction from the Arctic. Although the Alaska Pipeline has 
long been a major outlet for American Arctic oil, the Obama 
administration has expressed interest in studying the viability of 
Northwest Passage shipping for natural resources,42 which has thus far 
been absent from any American strategic plans.43 When cruise ships 
 
37. Id. at 21. 
38. Id. at 20. 
39. Deggim, supra note 30. 
40. O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 17  In a footnote to the report, O’Rourke 
posits that shipping firms might find the transcontinental railroad 
routes in Canada and the United States to be a faster means of moving 
goods and commodities from the Atlantic to the Pacific than the 
Northwest Passage. This author believes this statement to be partly 
political, given the nature of the intended audience of the report. Id. 
41. See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer & Clifford Krauss, Russia Embraces 
Offshore Arctic Drilling, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/business/global/16arctic.html?pa
gewanted=all. 
42. See EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC 
REGION 5 (May 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 
43. Borgerson, supra note 34, at 88. 
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do enter the Arctic, they do not typically do so to transit the length 
of either the Northern Sea Route or the Northwest Passage, but 
rather to visit the environmental tourism sites of Greenland, 
Svalbard, and Jan Mayen.44   
B. The Patchwork Nature of Existing International Law in the Arctic 
The Arctic is not without coverage by binding international law, 
but none of the existing laws adequately addresses Arctic-specific 
needs. Several general agreements cover Arctic shipping, but only 
insofar as they are binding on all ships throughout the world. The 
Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) addresses the requirements 
for crew and passenger well-being in the event of an emergency at sea. 
The Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (STCW) addresses the minimum competency requirements 
for crew and officers onboard ships. These agreements, overseen by 
the IMO, are designed for general global use, from tropical waters to 
polar seas, and offer a baseline for global marine standards.45 
However, none specifically covers the particular nature of Arctic 
maritime conditions, with its consistently shallow and frigid waters. 
Additionally, since existing IMO regulations depend on flag state 
enforcement, some ships wishing to access Arctic ports may fall short 
of the necessary requirements because of the known lax enforcement 
found on ships operating under flags of convenience.46 Since crew and 
passenger welfare are vital when operating in polar waters, allowing a 
ship that operates under a flag of convenience in accordance with the 
existing IMO regime could be a genuine hazard to the environment of 
the Arctic. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) is a major governing agreement for the Arctic Ocean that 
provides a framework for future rules regarding shipping.47 Despite its 
near-universal acceptance, and its passage into customary 
international law, its application in the Arctic has problems. First, the 
United States is not yet a party to UNCLOS, and while the United 
States does accept UNCLOS as customary international law, it does 
not yet enforce some of the provisions of UNCLOS through state 
 
44. O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 18. Tourism through the sea routes is not 
impossible, however: the M/S Explorer transited through the Northwest 
Passage, following the route taken by Road Amundsen, in 1984. ARCTIC 
MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2 at 21. 
45. O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 20. 
46. Id. at 20–21. While the majority of shipping lines are based in developed 
states, many elect to register their ships in such countries as Panama, 
Liberia, the Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, Cyprus, and Malta, due to 
their attractive tax structures and the nature of their ship inspection 
regimes. Id. 
47. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 50. 
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mechanisms.48 Second, even if the United States were a party to 
UNCLOS, Article 234, which addresses ice-covered waters, is 
controversial. Nominally, it is intended to allow states with claims to 
ice-covered waters to regulate shipping activities in those waters to 
minimize the environmental effects of the transit while still permitting 
free navigation.49 Yet, this implicit allowance of some sovereign 
control over free navigation has been regarded as “‘probably the most 
ambiguous, if not controversial, clause in the entire treaty,’” due to 
the lack of clear interpretation as to what the UNCLOS drafters 
meant by certain elements of the text.50 Thus, the international 
community has yet to come to a consensus on how to address special 
issues of Arctic maritime operations. 
C. The State of the Polar Code 
The IMO has been working on the Polar Code, the future binding 
guidelines for Arctic maritime operations, for over ten years.51 Since 
2002, it has released the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters (IMO Guidelines). Created out of a need for some form of 
standards for shipping in the sensitive polar regions, the IMO 
Guidelines establish target safety goals for commercial ships operating 
in commonly-recognized Arctic and Antarctic waters.52 The IMO 
Guidelines also establish the concept of a Polar-class ship, one that 
would be certified to operate in polar regions with minimal concerns 
for the safety and integrity of the vessel and crew.53 The IMO has 
now released the codified form of the guidelines as the Polar Code, 
though due to the nature of the Code and existing IMO regulations, 
its earliest implementation date is scheduled to be in 2016.54   
The current form of the IMO Guidelines, adopted in late 2009,55 
form a comprehensive regulatory structure for almost all matters 
 
48. See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions 
to the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 29 October 2013, 
U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_rat
ifications.htm (noting the absence of the United States). 
49. JENSEN, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
50. Id. at 7. 
51. See O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 21. 
52. See generally Polar Code, supra note 7. 
53. Polar Code, supra note 7, at ch. 1.1.3. 
54. See generally Shipping in Polar Waters, supra note 4. 
55. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters, IMO Assemb. Res. A.1024 (26) (Dec. 2, 2009), at 1, available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=29985&filena
me=A1024(26).pdf [hereinafter Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters].   
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related to ship operations in the designated Arctic and Antarctic 
zones, from construction to crewing to emergency operations.56 New 
ship design for the Polar regions must conform to a set of 
requirements that depend on (1) when the ship will transit through 
the Polar regions, and (2) the conditions of the sea ice at the time of 
the transit.57 Regardless of the specific timing and type of transit, 
Polar-class ships must all conform to certain minimum environmental 
minimum requirements, including: a more rigorous construction 
method of double hulls and double bottoms for all ships, especially 
those carrying hazardous cargoes;58 having engineering plants and 
electrical machinery that can withstand the cold and rigors of ice;59 
minimizing the crew’s exposure to frigid exterior conditions;60 having 
lifesaving equipment on-board specifically designed for cold-weather 
operations;61 and special navigational equipment that enhance the 
ability of the officers to navigate through polar waters.62 It establishes 
the position of Ice Navigator, a new officer of the deck department 
whose task is to monitor polar waters for any ice that places the 
integrity of the ship at risk. It is a position for which “consideration 
should be…given…when planning voyages into polar waters.”63 The 
requirements are significant, and are a sizable expansion to the 
requirements already imposed by the IMO on commercial vessels, but 
are necessary to ensure the integrity of ships and crews navigating 
through these waters. The recent experience of the M/V Akademik 
Shokalskiy in the Antarctic speaks to the omnipresent dangers to 
ships in the Polar regions, even those like the Akademik Shokalskiy, 
which were designed for such waters.64 The maritime community 
needs a strong polar code to ensure that the Akademik Shokalskiy is 
not another Exxon Valdez.65   
 
56. Id. at 4.  
57. Id. at 10 (explaining the seven classes of Polar ships and the specific 
conditions through which these ships may operate). 
58. Id. at 14.   
59. Id. at 14–15.  
60. Id. at 17–19.  
61. Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, supra note 54, at 21–
24.   
62. Id. at 24–27.   
63. Id. at 11.   
64. See Henry Fountain, Second Icebreaker Nears Ship Stranded off 
Antarctica, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/12/30/world/antarctica-ship.html. 
65. See Philip Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels 
of Oil off Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1989, at A1, available at 
ProQuest. 
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The existing IMO Guidelines, however, have many flaws if they 
are to be implemented as is in the Polar Code. First, the IMO 
Guidelines are just that – guidelines.  They are not currently binding, 
and Polar-class ships so far exist primarily on paper.66 While the IMO 
has a timeline for implementation of the Code based on the 
Guidelines, its recent history with acceptance of its guidelines and 
regulations is frustrating. At the 2012 conference of the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee, the IMO Secretary-General 
pledged at the opening of the conference that binding greenhouse gas 
limitations would be in force worldwide by 2015.67 However, certain 
major maritime nations, such as China and Brazil, sought concessions 
on the emissions reduction quantity, frustrating the intent of the 
IMO.68 At the end of that week, IMO Secretary-General Koji 
Sekimizu voiced the IMO’s frustration at its member states’ failure to 
achieve meaningful progress, stating, “I have, at this moment, no idea 
how we can achieve [a binding greenhouse gas emissions protocol].”69 
This recent history demonstrates that the IMO’s enforcement 
capabilities through mutual cooperation are not strong on potentially 
controversial issues such as greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, if an issue 
as important as the Polar Code is to have full acceptance, it needs an 
enforcement mechanism to avoid the kind of standards reduction and 
possible regulatory avoidance seen with the greenhouse gas 
conference. 
Second, the Code would only apply to ships greater than 500 
gross tons engaging in international voyages. Domestic, security, and 
leisure voyages are not covered under the current IMO Guidelines.70 
Even with fishing vessels, only those with a length of at least 12 
meters are treated by the IMO, and vessels between 12 meters and 24 
 
66. See generally INT’L ASS’N OF CLASSIFICATION SOC’YS, REQUIREMENTS 
CONCERNING POLAR CLASS (2011), available at http://www.iacs.org.uk/ 
document/public/Publications/Unified_requirements/PDF/UR_I_pdf4
10.pdf. 
67. Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), 63rd Session, 27 
February to 2 March 2012: Opening Address by IMO Secretary-General 
Koji Sekimizu, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.imo.org/ 
MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Secretary-
GeneralsSpeechesToMeetings/Pages/MEPC-63-Opening.aspx.   
68. David Thorpe, IMO Failure to Tackle Shipping Emissions May Force 
EU Action, LINK2 (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.link2portal.com/imo-
failure-tackle-shipping-emissions-may-force-eu-action.   
69. Marine Environment Policy Committee (MEPC), 63rd Session, 27 
February to 2 March 2012 (closing remarks): Closing Remarks by IMO 
Secretary-General Koji Sekimizu, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Secretary-
GeneralsSpeechesToMeetings/Pages/MEPC-63-closing.aspx.   
70. O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 21 (2013). 
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meters operate under a voluntary regime.71 Although all are bound by 
existing rules regarding oil in marine environments, they are still 
subject to domestic laws rather than international ones with respect 
to their operations in the Arctic.  And even though many domestic 
laws regarding ship standards in the Arctic are robust and well-
enforced, they are not standardized.72 This can be a liability in a 
region as compact as is the Arctic.  Thus, since the Arctic Council 
states promulgate the domestic laws governing fishing vessel 
standards, and since the Arctic Council states enforce these standards 
on their own vessels in the Polar Code zone, the IMO ought to 
include the Arctic Council as an enforcement body in its final draft of 
the Polar Code. 
D. Lessons from the SAR Agreement 
If the Arctic Council does take an enforcement role with the Polar 
Code, such a role needs to follow the precedents the Council has set 
for itself regarding the enforcement of its own agreements. Swedish 
Foreign Minister Carl Bildt’s succinct description of the work style of 
the Council—”[f]irmly based in established principles of international 
law, but with particular responsibilities for the directly adjacent 
nations”73—formed the basis of the first binding, enforceable 
agreement created under the auspices of the Arctic Council, the 
Search and Rescue Agreement (SAR Agreement). Although search 
and rescue is a clearer point of unified action than other key Arctic 
issues, the SAR Agreement is nevertheless a useful template for how 
the Arctic Council can better assert itself on the world stage when 
other international organizations are unable or unwilling to do so in a 
region as sensitive as the Arctic.   
The terms of this agreement mark a critical path forward for the 
Arctic Council with respect to its ability to enforce binding 
agreements in a unified manner.  This agreement is narrow in scope—
it does not seek to overhaul the entire Arctic Council’s existing 
structure, nor directly impede on existing agreements or applicable 
international law. However, despite its narrow scope, it has broad-
reaching implications for relations among the Arctic states. The 
agreement finalizes territorial claims on a functional basis by 
delimiting which states have search and rescue priorities within the 
 
71. Deggim, supra note 30. 
72. JENSEN, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
73. Carl Bildt, Op-Ed., Northern Beacon, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/global/Carl-Bildt-Why-
the-Arctic-Council-Matters.html. 
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Arctic zone.74 This establishes the Arctic Council’s ability to function 
as both an administrative and an enforcement body, even when 
conceding that international legal disputes may yet alter the specifics 
of the agreement.75   
The SAR Agreement also asserts certain minimum levels of 
information sharing and standards regulation, which is a necessary 
element of a unified Polar Code enforcement scheme. Article 9 of the 
Agreement lays out the minimum ways in which the states must 
cooperate with each other, which includes but is not limited to: 
sharing of communications and meteorological information; sharing of 
resources; knowledge of each other’s search-and-rescue capabilities; 
and supporting joint initiatives to improve search-and-rescue in the 
Arctic.76 The 2009 Tromsø Declaration asks that the same 
interactions occur regarding shipping and maritime standards, noting 
that increased marine access to the Arctic will require greater 
cooperation amongst the Arctic Council states to craft a suitable 
policy.77 
Finally, the provision allowing for periodic review and revision of 
the Agreement is highly significant for the Arctic Council and perhaps 
for the Polar Code. Up until 2011, the Council served as a body 
through which the Arctic states could confer on issues and policy of 
mutual import, but has few actual powers. With this regular meetings 
provision, however, the Arctic Council was able to fulfill the promise 
of the Nuuk Declaration of 2011.78 Now, it can position itself to 
become a more significant international legal body by reviewing 
agreements for what works and what does not, and seek to improve 
on the shortcomings of the Arctic Council’s binding agreements. This 
framework can be extended to an enforcement mechanism of the 
Polar Code, by using the institutional body of the Arctic Council as a 
means of improving on Polar shipping while conserving the Polar 
environment. 
 
74. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic, Multilateral (Arctic Council), May 12, 2011, 
T.I.A.S. No. 13-119 [hereinafter SAR Agreement]. 
75. Id. (“The delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to and 
shall not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States or 
their sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction.”). 
76. Id. 
77. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE TROMSØ DECLARATION: THE SIXTH 
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/ 
category/5-declarations [hereinafter Tromsø Declaration]. 
78. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE NUUK DECLARATION: THE SEVENTH 
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/ 
category/5-declarations [hereinafter Nuuk Declaration]. 
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IV. Why the Arctic Council Must Become Involved in 
the Polar Code 
The Arctic Council has already expressed its interest in having a 
binding shipping agreement for the Arctic, and now is the time for the 
Council to act on that interest and integrate its interests into the 
Polar Code. The Council has addressed the need for a shipping 
agreement many times in its seventeen-year history, starting with the 
Barrow Declaration in 2000 that endorsed the work of the IMO in 
creating what would become the IMO Guidelines.79 In 2006, the 
Arctic Council emphasized its desire to promote greater cooperation 
among its member states regarding standards for marine safety, 
emphasizing the desire for the Arctic Council states to find a 
collective solution to a pending problem.80 The Council grew more 
concerned in its Tromsø Declaration of 2009, urging the IMO to make 
its IMO Guidelines mandatory. The Council specifically requested 
that “global IMO ship safety and pollution preventions conventions 
be augmented with specific mandatory requirements or other 
provisions for ship construction, design, equipment, crewing, training 
and operations, aimed at safety and protection of the Arctic 
environment.”81 The Arctic Council has reiterated the Tromsø request 
since 2009, urging the IMO to complete the work of the Polar Code in 
2011,82 and encouraging greater cooperation between the Arctic 
Council and the IMO in 2013.83   
The logical nexus of these parallel interests is the inclusion of the 
Arctic Council as both an advisory and enforcement arm of the Polar 
Code in the Arctic. While the IMO has expertise in the field of 
maritime shipping, the Arctic Council has expertise in Arctic affairs, 
and recognizes the interconnected nature of economics, law, and 
environment in the Arctic.84 As Foreign Minister Bildt put it, “[t]he 
Arctic Council brings together the eight states, and the indigenous 
 
79. Barrow Declaration, supra note 6, at ¶ 11. 
80. ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE SALEKHARD DECLARATION: THE FIFTH 
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 7–8 (2006), available at 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/ 
category/5-declarations. 
81. Tromsø Declaration, supra note 76, at 4. 
82. Nuuk Declaration, supra note 77, at 4. 
83. ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE KIRUNA DECLARATION: THE EIGHTH MINISTERIAL 
MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 4 (2013), available at http:// 
www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/5-
declarations. 
84. About the Arctic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL (last visited Nov. 10, 2013), 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-
council/about-arctic-council. 
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peoples, in a pragmatic cooperation to tackle the common challenges 
and shape the events ahead of the curve.”85 The Council empowered 
itself in 2011 to act more independently to “address emerging 
challenges in the Arctic,” 86 and has set a pattern of making its 
decisions “[f]irmly based in established principles of international law, 
but with particular responsibilities for the directly adjacent nations.”87 
Further, at the IMO’s recent Workshop in Safe Ship Operations in 
the Arctic Ocean, held on February 28, 2014, Prof. Oran Young of the 
University of California-Santa Barbara specifically pointed to the 
Arctic Council as an institutional body capable of enforcing the Polar 
Cod. He focused on the Council’s experience with the SAR Agreement 
and a more recent agreement on Arctic marine pollution as indicative 
of the Council’s ability to work within the scope of existing IMO 
agreements and specifically incorporate and enforce the Polar Code 
within the realm of the Arctic Council.88 Thus, any partnership 
between the IMO and the Arctic Council regarding the Polar Code 
can and will be mutually beneficial. 
The Arctic Council thus has both the capacity and the will to 
bring the Polar Code into practical force, based on its analysis of 
shipping conditions in its comprehensive 2009 analysis of Arctic 
marine shipping. Drawing on data going back to 1970, the Arctic 
Council found that sea ice in the Arctic was at its smallest extent in 
the mid-2000s. Predictive models then warned of the possibility of a 
completely ice-free summer by 2050.89 This gradual retreat of sea ice 
from the Arctic Ocean could permit “the possibility of moving 
straight across an ice-free Polar area during parts of the year,” 
eliminating the long-term need for the Northern Sea Route and 
Northwest Passage.90 The Arctic Council recognizes this now, while it 
is unclear if the IMO does. This ability to merge the Arctic Council’s 
environmental data into pressing economic and political problems into 
the IMO’s Polar Code work is why the Arctic Council is well suited to 
become a future partner for the IMO. 
 
85. Bildt, supra note 72 
86. Nuuk Declaration, supra note 77, at 2. In so doing, the Arctic Council 
finally institutionalized itself with the creation of an Arctic Council 
Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, a key element in transitioning the 
Arctic Council from a cooperative group to an administrative one. Id. 
87. Bildt, supra note 72. 
88. See Oran R. Young, Institutional Interplay in the Arctic Ocean, INT’L 
MAR. ORG. (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.imo.org/ MediaCentre/ 
HotTopics/polar/Documents/Arctic2014/14.%20Prof.%20O.%20Young. 
pdf. 
89. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 26–27. 
90. Bildt, supra note 72. 
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The IMO-mandated, Arctic Council-enforced Polar Code policing 
regime would be a consistent program of inspection, certification, and 
necessary quarantine by the competent agencies of each Arctic 
Council state. The SAR Agreement already united these maritime 
police agencies for a common purpose, including the United States 
Coast Guard and the Russian Federal Agency for Maritime and River 
Transport, and on a matter of such import to the Council, these 
agencies can be bound together again for mutual maritime policing. 
At any of the designated entry points into Arctic waters, ships would 
submit themselves to an inspection by one of the named agencies to 
ensure that they meet the requirements of the Polar Code, especially 
those regarding ship design, lifesaving measures, and cold-weather 
operations. If the enforcement agencies know that a particular ship 
meets Polar class standards, as laid out in the Polar Code, then the 
agency will permit that ship to enter Arctic waters. If a ship fails to 
meet code, then it will be escorted to a port where it will be 
quarantined and not permitted entry into Arctic waters. 
The Arctic Council states must be the ones to carry out this task 
because the IMO relies entirely on voluntary state party enforcement, 
which can produce potentially catastrophic oversights.  This risk is 
best explained through the following hypothetical, whose reality is not 
too far-fetched. Ten years from now, when enough of the Arctic 
Ocean will be ice-free to permit more consistent transit of the entirety 
of either the Northern Sea Route or the Northwest Passage, a 
company in Southeast Asia contracts to ship hazardous industrial 
materials from Europe to Vietnam by ocean freighter. The freighter, 
flagged in Liberia, would be able to make the transit safely by way of 
the Suez Canal, but to save time and expenses, decides to take the 
Northern Sea Route, despite it not being properly outfitted per Polar 
Code regulations. Taking that risk, but believing the conditions safe 
enough to make the transit anyway, the ship leaves Rotterdam and 
heads north for Norwegian waters and the Kara Gate.  All is well 
until it is well into the Arctic Circle, near the Norwegian-Russian 
border, at which point an early winter squall hits the ship. Since it 
does not meet Polar Code regulations, it is not insulated well-enough 
to prevent the interior of the ship from dropping in temperature. As a 
result, the engine starts malfunctioning due to the cold, and the Chief 
Engineer turns it off to fix it. Now adrift, and without a pilot trained 
for Polar waters, the ship is blown off-course and onto a poorly 
charted rock formation, which breaches the hull. The Captain orders 
the ship abandoned, but the lifeboats are neither built nor equipped 
for the Arctic. Although all the crew get away safely, the cold and 
wind cause two crew to succumb to the cold and two more to suffer 
hypothermia before Russian forces can get to the scene and rescue the 
crew Meanwhile, the abandoned ship starts leaking its hazardous 
cargo into the water, which begins fouling the shoreline a few nautical 
miles away. Despite receiving aid from the Norwegians, neither the 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Freezing Out Noncompliant Ships 
446 
Russians nor the Norwegians are able to easily stanch the leak of 
hazardous chemicals into the water, and so the Russians must 
commence an environmental cleanup. The Russian authorities file a 
suit in admiralty against the shipowner for failure to maintain a 
navigable ship, and although they win judgment, the recovery is 
paltry compared to the cost of cleanup. At the end of all this, two 
crew have died, one ship with cargo is lost, and Russia’s remote 
northern shore has suffered hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of 
environmental damage. If the Arctic Council states had police power 
over enforcement of the Polar Code in the North Pole region, then 
either Norwegian or Russian forces could have stopped the ship, 
inspected it, found it out of compliance, and compelled it to dock at 
the nearest port pending an adequate solution. 
This scenario, while not an everyday one, is not unreasonable, and 
has been one of the primary criticisms of the Polar Code as it exists 
now: without an active enforcement mechanism and without a clear 
protocol for retrofitting.91 It also speaks to the current problem with 
IMO regulation adherence: the means of enforcement and compliance. 
The IMO concedes that it is voluntary,92 and is classic problem of 
sovereignty and international compliance described by Chayes and 
Chayes: the competing systems of coercive enforcement and 
compliance management.93 In coercive enforcement, when one state 
party violates the terms of an international treaty or regulatory 
system, other state parties to the same treaty or regulatory system 
impose monetary or other penalties on the offending state, intending 
to compel compliance. In many instances, states may sign on to a 
treaty with good intentions, but later decide that compliance is not 
worth the benefits of membership if it can avoid the obligation.   
The Polar Code may yet have issues that require coercive 
enforcement, but the more likely problems with the Code would stem 
from compliance management issues. In compliance management, 
state parties perceive an obligation to follow an agreement to which 
they have subscribed themselves, and so do not seek to violate the 
terms of the agreement, unlike states that meet coercive enforcement. 
However, the agreement itself may be flawed in either its structure or 
 
91. See IMO’s ‘Polar Code’ Ignores Environmental Dangers of Increased 




92. See Implementation, Control and Coordination, INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Implementation/Pages/Default.a
spx (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
93. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
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AGREEMENTS 2–3 (1995). 
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monitoring mechanisms, and so states may find themselves out of 
compliance with an agreement due to misunderstandings about is 
application. In such instances, Chayes and Chayes argue, attempting 
to coerce compliance through sanctions is a costly and misguided 
mistake.94   
This dilemma—not requiring sanctions but encountering 
confusion regarding compliance—can be resolved through Arctic 
Council enforcement, if applied properly. Individual states may not 
have the capacity to conduct all the necessary inspections all the 
time, but if an independent or commonly recognized entity carried out 
the inspections, one that all parties respected and that followed a set 
of accepted technical parameters, then that inspection entity could 
better guarantee regulatory compliance. Here, the Arctic Council 
forces would carry out the monitoring and compliance verification, 
and if they had the power to escort noncomplying ships into port to 
make the necessary changes, then over time the global shipping 
community will recognize better the minimum standards and 
monitoring mechanisms of the Code. Further, under this inspection 
system, the standards for Code enforcement can start quite high, 
which can help insure better global compliance.95 A previous IMO 
regulatory code, regarding marine oil pollution, suffered from lack of 
compliance until the IMO changed the code to require separate ballast 
tanks for oil and water. The change was costly to shipping lines, but 
the cost of noncompliance rose very quickly as state parties like the 
United States demanded full compliance,96 and marine insurers and 
protection & indemnity clubs (P & I) refused to grant coverage to 
ships until they complied.97 This need for high initial standards may 
be essential, due to concerns that the Code does not adequately 
address issues of pollution and retrofitting,98 and the United States 
has already begun analyzing how the Code will shape the safety, 
security, and commercial interests and operations of American and 
international corporations in the Arctic off Alaska.99   
 
94. See id. at 2. 
95. See id. at 184. 
96. See id. at 185. 
97. See id. Protection & indemnity clubs (P & I) are mutual insurance 
groups created by clubs of shipping lines for their own benefit when 
traditional marine insurers such as Lloyd’s of London capped their 
coverage  See NICHOLAS J. HEALY ET AL., ADMIRALTY 171–72 (5th ed. 
2012).   
98. See TRANSP. & ENV’T, supra note 90. 
99. See Timothy Gardner & Andrea Shalal-Esa, White House Releases Plan 
to Make Arctic Shipping Safer, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2014, 8:06 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/31/us-usa-arctic-whitehouse-
idUSBREA0U00X20140131. 
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With the Polar Code, the costs to shipping lines for 
noncompliance would be high, if someone actually monitors the ships. 
If, for example, a Russian ship were to find a merchant carrier in the 
Arctic in violation of the Code, it might escorted the ship to the port 
of Arkhangelsk until the shipper came up with a solution. The 
shipping line would then need to find a ship that was Polar Code 
compliant to go to Arkhangelsk, have the cargo transferred from the 
noncompliant ship to the compliant ship, then have the noncompliant 
ship finish the trip, probably at a higher expense than expected. 
Then, the shipping line would need to somehow get the noncompliant 
ship out of Arkhangelsk—perhaps under special escort—then either 
never send it into the Arctic again or retrofit it to meet Code prior to 
another Arctic crossing. Since P & Is have already capped their 
coverage of pollution damage from ship negligence,100 the shipping 
lines cannot afford to avoid compliance, lest they suffer from a horrific 
accident such as the one described supra. Indeed, one Norwegian P & 
I club has already stated that while the existing Code is a good step, 
it cannot be the final expression of the IMO regarding commercial 
shipping in the Arctic.101 By comparison, the costs to the Arctic 
Council states would most likely not be very high, and since the 
Arctic Council already has provisions for mutual operations due to 
the SAR Agreement, issues regarding coverage overlap and 
operational expenses would be minimal, especially in comparison to 
the cost of a horrific accident in the event of noncompliance.   
This system would compel expanded compliance with the Polar 
Code by shipping lines that might wish to skirt around IMO 
regulatory requirements. The prospect that a line’s ship, with 
valuable cargo, would be denied access to a valuable shipping route 
would compel the lines into a calculation of the value of Polar Code-
compliance compared to using longer sea routes. For those lines that 
would find the Polar routes more attractive, the prospect of having 
ships detained due to non-compliance with the Polar Code will 
hopefully incentivize those lines to either order new ships that meet 
the Polar Code, or to retrofit ships so that they come up to code. This 
is especially important for those ships that use flags of convenience, 
since shipping lines often use such registrations to avoid compliance 
with strict maritime regulations. Now, with a uniform, regional 
enforcement regime, these lines will have no choice but to abide by 
the Polar Code. 
This enforcement regime will put a burden on the Arctic Council 
states, but they need to bear that burden for the sake of the Arctic. 
The purpose of the Polar Code is to create “additional provisions 
[beyond existing maritime regulations] deemed necessary…to take into 
 
100. See HEALY ET AL., supra note 96, at 214. 
101. See Gardner & Shalal-Esa, supra note 98. 
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account the climactic conditions of polar waters and to meet 
appropriate standards of maritime safety and pollution prevention.”102 
The Arctic Council has already addressed some issues of maritime 
safety through the SAR Agreement, and agreed within the past year 
on a united response plan to marine oil pollution.103 Both these 
agreements require monitoring, response, and prevention capabilities 
on the parts of the Arctic Council states, which presumably have the 
capacity to fulfill all their stated obligations. As the Polar Code 
bolsters these existing agreements, it behooves the Arctic Council to 
assume a greater burden of enforcement responsibility if they wish to 
ensure the future integrity of the Arctic. 
V. Implications for the Future of the Arctic 
If the IMO agrees to work together with the Arctic Council on 
Polar Code enforcement, the Arctic Council can come into its own as 
a stronger global leader in regional management. This precedent is 
critical to the future of Arctic affairs because of how the rest of the 
world will need to adapt to a more robust Arctic regime. The Arctic 
is not a region sealed off from the rest of the world. To the contrary, 
it is an economically expanding region, with commodities and tourism 
on the rise, and a steadily growing need for reliable transportation.104 
With key actors coming from all parts of the world to engage in 
Arctic activities, these actors may become discouraged if they 
encounter a confusing or complex regulatory scheme for this emerging 
region, one that may be unnecessarily burdensome.105 Rather, the 
Arctic Council and the IMO can assert to the world that the Arctic is 
a region open to the world with certain necessary restrictions, if it is 
to be conserved for the future. In this way, non-regional actors can 
adapt their approach to the Arctic before they elect to economically 
engage with the region. 
While shipping and search and rescue agreements have had 
widespread and consistent support, future Arctic Council issues will 
likely be more contentious. The Council is already precluded from 
addressing issues related to security,106 and has consistently held itself 
 
102. Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, supra note 54, at 4. 
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out to be more concerned with issues of economics and the 
environment.107 This leaves open three major areas that touch on both 
economics and the environment: fishing, mining, and oil drilling. The 
last of these may prove to be the most contentious, given the drive by 
certain Arctic Council states to expand their domestic energy 
capacity.108 The other two may face similar problems, since these are 
income sources for residents of the North. Whether or not 
international law will be able to assist the Arctic Council in 
addressing these problems remains to be seen, since this pattern of 
adapting existing law to the regional specifications of the Arctic is the 
common pattern of successful Arctic Council action. It may be that 
the Arctic Council will need to have a new mandate in the biennial 
declarations, similar to the Nuuk Declaration mandate, that allows it 
to craft new agreements where none exist in international law. 
Further, since almost all of these issues will require the use of the 
Arctic Ocean, the Polar Code may need to be regularly updated, 
perhaps to include fishing activities in addition to commercial 
shipping. For now, though, the Council has proven that its model of 
regional management and enforcement can work.  The SAR 
Agreement came into force this way, and cooperation with the IMO 
on the Polar Code will only strengthen the position of the Arctic 
Council for the future.  In spite of some initial hesitation on the part 
of the Council, it is ready to act in the name of Arctic welfare. 
VI. Conclusion 
The Arctic needs the Polar Code, and the Arctic Council must be 
a part of the Polar Code. Although only seventy-one ships transited 
the entire length of the Northern Sea Route in 2013, more than one 
thousand entered Arctic waters for commercial purposes.109 These 
ships may bring benefits to the four million Arctic residents, but they 
also pose special dangers to the Arctic waters and environment that 
the international community has yet to encounter. The Polar Code is 
the best chance to ensure the future integrity of the Arctic in the face 
of increased commercial activity, but the only clear method of 
ensuring the Code’s full effect is for the IMO to incorporate the Arctic  
index.php/en/document-archive/category/4-founding-documents 
[hereinafter Ottawa Declaration]. 
107. See About the Arctic Council, supra note 83. 
108. See Andrew E. Kramer & Clifford Krauss, Russia Embraces Offshore 
Arctic Drilling, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2011), http:// 
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d=all; see EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
THE ARCTIC REGION 5 (May 2013), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy. pdf. 
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Council as an entity into the Code’s enforcement and success. Arctic 
experts have already indicated the importance of incorporating the 
Council,110 and already individual Council states have begun the 
process of analyzing the Code to see how they can best adapt to its 
mandates.111 But Canada, Norway, and the United States cannot 
complete the task alone—they need the partnership of all the Arctic 
Council states, which necessarily requires the Council as an 
international institution to act in partnership with the IMO. Arctic 
Council enforcement of the Code will ensure that shipping lines come 
into compliance with the Code, help minimize the effects of using 
flags of convenience to avoid potentially costly yet safe retrofits to 
ships, and ensure that the expanding Arctic maintains its core 
environmental integrity. If the Arctic Council states will not enforce 
the Code, then too many noncompliant ships will slip through, and 
given the rise of Arctic oil drilling, only one ship needs to have an 
accident to experience another Exxon Valdez. The IMO must embrace 
the concept of active enforcement of its regulations, and the Arctic 
Council can and should act to enforce the Polar Code, not only for 
themselves, but for the rest of the world. 
 
 
110. See Young, supra note 87. 
111. See Gardner & Shalal-Esa, supra note 98. 
  
